Promoting Homeownership Among Low-Income Households by Edgar O. Olsen
THE URBAN INSTITUTE
Edgar O. Olsen
Opportunity and Ownership Project
Report No. 2
Promoting 
Homeownership
among Low-Income 
Households

THE URBAN INSTITUTE
Edgar O. Olsen
Promoting 
Homeownership
among Low-Income 
Households
Copyright © August 2007. The Urban Institute. All rights reserved. Except for short quotes, no part of this paper
may be reproduced in any form or used in any form by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy-
ing, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without written permission from the Urban Institute.
Given the chance, many low-income families can acquire assets and become more financially secure.
Conservatives and liberals increasingly agree that government’s role in this transition requires going beyond
traditional antipoverty programs to encourage savings, homeownership, private pensions, and microenterprise.
The Urban Institute’s Opportunity and Ownership Project reports present some of our findings, analyses, and
recommendations. The Urban Institute is grateful to the Annie E. Casey Foundation and the Ford Foundation
for funding the reports.
The current system of housing assistancediffers enormously from an ideal sys-
tem based on compelling arguments for govern-
ment action. The bulk of housing subsidies is
provided to middle- and upper-income house-
holds through the favorable tax treatment of
homeownership under the federal individual
income tax (Carasso et al. 2005; Ling and McGill
1992). These tax provisions induce more mid-
dle- and upper-income households to be home-
owners than if the homeownership preferences
were eliminated and tax rates were reduced
proportionally to raise the same tax revenue,
and they induce homeowners in these income
categories to occupy better housing than under
this alternative tax system (Rosen 1979). These
distortions in individual choice serve no com-
pelling social purpose.
In contrast to the housing subsidies pro-
vided under the tax code to middle- and upper-
income households, the current system of
low-income housing assistance is strongly
biased against homeownership. Programs that
subsidize homeownership account for only 
10 percent of total spending on income-tested
housing programs and for even less spending
on programs that help the poorest households.1
Calculations from the 2003 National American
Housing Survey show that the average per
capita income of the households served by low-
income homeownership programs is about
three times as large as the average for house-
holds served by low-income rental programs.
This paper takes no position on whether
governments should encourage low-income
households to become homeowners but does
assume that governments should not actively
discourage it. To neutralize the current bias in
government programs against homeownership,
the paper suggests reforms that do not require
additional spending. The appropriate level of
spending is a separable question not addressed
here.
One reform involves converting the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment’s (HUD) Section 8 housing voucher
program to one neutral with respect to home-
ownership. Two variations on that theme are to
provide a down-payment subsidy for first-time
homebuyers under the voucher program and to
expand voucher opportunities for those in sub-
sidized housing projects. Shifting public funds
from programs that subsidize rental housing
projects to the revised voucher program would
increase homeownership among low-income
households. A second possible reform would
allow the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit 
to be used for homeownership as well as for
rental housing projects. One way to achieve this
second reform without spending more money
would be to devote the annual increase in the 
tax credit allocation to a refundable tax credit 
for homeownership for low-income house-
holds. Such reforms would improve the current 
system’s effectiveness in achieving its primary
goal of helping people obtain good-quality
housing.
The next section of the paper documents
the anti-homeownership bias in the current
system of low-income housing assistance.
Drawing on the evidence concerning the per-
formance of past housing programs, the paper
then discusses its implications for the design of
efficient low-income homeownership pro-
grams. Finally, the paper describes the pro-
posed reforms and why they would enhance
1
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the nation’s effort to improve housing out-
comes for low-income families.
Anti-Homeownership Bias in the
Current System of 
Low-Income Housing Assistance
Several pieces of evidence suggest that the cur-
rent system of low-income housing assistance is
biased against homeownership for the poorest
households. The first is that the poorest home-
owners are much less likely to obtain subsidies
than renters with similarly low income. To doc-
ument this differential, data from the 2003
National American Housing Survey are used to
examine subsidy and homeownership patterns
by income groups, incorporating area differ-
ences in living costs and adding an imputed
return on home equity to homeowners’ in-
comes.2 The results in table 1 highlight the dis-
advantage of the poorest households that want
to be homeowners relative to those that prefer
to rent. Of those in the bottom 10 percent of real
household income, the government provided
less than 5 percent of homeowners, but nearly
25 percent of renters, with a subsidy in 2003.3
For the near poor, those in the 10th to 20th per-
centiles of real income, the same pattern holds
true. The pattern is also the same when house-
holds of each size are considered separately.
Another way to capture the subsidy pat-
terns is to compare the homeownership rates of
subsidized and unsubsidized low-income
households. Table 1 shows that homeowner-
ship rates are much higher for unsubsidized
than for subsidized households in the two low-
est real income categories. Among the poorest
10 percent of households, less than 5 percent of
subsidized households were homeowners, com-
pared to about 25 percent of unsubsidized
households. The gap is smaller, but still sub-
stantial, in the second decile of the distribution
of real income.
The absence of subsidies for low-income
homeowners and the extremely low home-
ownership rate among subsidized households
suggests a strong policy bias against homeown-
ership.4 Many locations would not require espe-
cially high subsidies for homeownership to
become affordable. In 2005, over 20 percent 
of homes in the United States had values of
$80,000 or less (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2006).
Even if a homebuyer were to borrow enough to
pay the entire sum of $80,000 at a 6 percent rate
of interest, his payments on a 30-year loan
would amount to about $480 per month. Taxes
and insurance would add to the cost. But, a
combined cost of $550 to $600 would be well
within the reach of families combining the hous-
ing subsidy with their own contributions. The
national average subsidy to the poorest house-
holds of the most common size under the
Table 1. Subsidy Rates by Homeownership Status and
Homeownership Rates by Subsidy Status for Households
in the Lowest Five Income Deciles, 2003
Percent Receiving Subsidies
< 10 10–20 20–30 30–40 40–50
Homeowners 4.6 7.0 8.3 7.4 6.6
Renters 24.8 11.7 5.5 4.6 3.5
Percent Owning Homes in Subsidized
and Unsubsidized Households
< 10 10–20 20–30 30–40 40–50
Unsubsidized 24.7 31.5 41.8 55.7 65.8
Subsidized 4.6 20.6 52.6 67.5 78.8
Source: 2003 National American Housing Survey (AHS).
Notes: A 10 percent return on home equity is added to the
income of each homeowner and a geographical consumer
price index is used to express all incomes in the prices of a
single locality. Except for home equity loans, the AHS does
not report outstanding balances on mortgages. For house-
holds with fixed-rate first and (if applicable) second mort-
gages, outstanding balances on all mortgages are calculated
using the procedures recommended by the U.S. Bureau of
the Census. These outstanding balances are added to the
reported outstanding balances on home equity loans and
the result is subtracted from the owner’s estimate of the
market value of the house to obtain an estimate of the
owner’s home equity. For the small minority of households
that do not have fixed-rate first and (if applicable) second
mortgages, home equity is predicted based on a nonlinear
regression of home equity on market value and date of pur-
chase that is estimated using data from for the preceding
group. The ACCRA geographical price index is used for
metropolitan areas identified in the 2003 National AHS and
regional metropolitan or nonmetropolitan averages of the
ACCRA index are used for other observations.
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Section 8 housing voucher program was about
$767 per month between April 2005 and April
2006.5 Therefore, even the poorest households
could afford to buy modest homes with the help
of a subsidy. With a subsidy that varies across
areas in a manner similar to the voucher pro-
gram, homeownership would be possible for
the poorest people, even in metropolitan areas
with the highest costs. Under the voucher
program, the monthly subsidy to the poorest
households of the most common size is $1,519
in San Francisco, $1,266 in Boston, and $1,075 in
New York City.
Although many policymakers have ex-
pressed interest in promoting homeownership
for low-income families, not much actual help
has materialized. HUD touts the homeowner-
ship option in its voucher program, but this
option has touched few households.
The Section 8 housing voucher program is
the federal government’s largest low-income
housing program, serving more than two mil-
lion households. Until recently, it provided
subsidies exclusively for rental housing. The
Housing and Community Development Act of
1992 authorized the provision of homeowner-
ship assistance to first-time homebuyers under
this program. However, HUD did not issue reg-
ulations for a homeownership option within 
the voucher program until after the Quality
Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998
revised the earlier legislation. The final regu-
lations were issued in September 2000 and
became effective in October 2000. This legisla-
tion allows, but does not require, local public
housing authorities to offer the homeownership
option to voucher recipients.
To date, few housing authorities have
offered the homeownership option, and these
authorities have offered it to few recipients.
Only about 450 of the 3,500 housing authorities
had offered the homeownership option as of
December 2005, and they provided it to only
about 4,000 families (Locke et al. 2006). The lim-
ited use of the homeownership option is not
due to a lack of interest on the part of low-
income families. As shown in table 1, about 
28 percent of all unsubsidized households in the
lowest real income quintile are homeowners.
Furthermore, when the Rand Corporation oper-
ated tenure-neutral entitlement housing assis-
tance programs in two metropolitan areas in 
the 1970s as a part of HUD’s Experimental
Housing Allowance Program (EHAP), about 
42 percent of recipients were homeowners, even
though only the poorest 16 and 21 percent of all
households in the two sites were eligible for
assistance.6
The primary reason adoption of the home-
ownership option within the Section 8 voucher
program was limited prior to 2005 is that local
public housing authorities did not receive addi-
tional administrative fees to defray the cost of
creating and operating such a program.7 There-
fore, only housing authorities whose directors
and boards felt most strongly that the option
was desirable had implemented it. In 2005,
HUD began to provide $5,000 to any housing
authority that established a homeownership
option in its voucher program and $1,000 in
administrative fees for each voucher recipient
who became a homeowner under this program.8
In 2006, enough money had been allocated to
provide $1,000 in administrative fees for 2,000
additional homeowners, but the proposed 
one-time financial incentive for local housing
authorities to establish a homeownership pro-
gram was not funded.9
In short, the current homeownership option
in the voucher program is extremely limited. It
is unlikely to expand greatly as long as its size is
left to the discretion of local housing authorities
and the additional administrative fees to defray
the extra costs of the homeownership option are
limited to so few households.
Avoiding Past Mistakes
This section briefly describes and critically ex-
amines the major low-income homeownership
programs. It explains why programs that sub-
sidize the construction of new units or that
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require intended beneficiaries to buy from
selected sellers will likely involve excessive
costs. It also points out why subsidized con-
struction is not necessary to increase the supply
of adequate housing, even in the tightest hous-
ing markets. In addition to presenting evidence
on the cost-effectiveness of homeownership
programs, the section summarizes the more
abundant evidence on the cost-effectiveness of
low-income rental programs.
Major Low-Income 
Homeownership Programs
The Housing Act of 1949 established the U.S.
Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Section
502 Single Family Direct Loan Program to pro-
vide eligible families with subsidies to buy a
new or existing house.10 Until 1968, the subsidy
was modest and did not depend on the house-
hold’s income. The subsidy consisted of lending
at the federal borrowing rate to farmers and
others living in rural areas. (Farmers now
account for a small share of all borrowers.) The
Housing Act of 1968 authorized the USDA to
pay a portion of the loan repayments for low-
income households. For the poorest households,
the USDA paid the difference between principal
and interest payments at the government’s bor-
rowing rate and 1 percent interest. For eligible
households with higher incomes, the USDA
paid the difference between the sum of prop-
erty taxes, homeowners insurance, operating
expenses, and principal and interest payments
at the government’s borrowing rate, and 20 per-
cent of the household’s adjusted income. Dur-
ing its first 50 years, the Section 502 Single
Family Direct Loan Program has provided over
$51 billion in homeownership loans to about 
1.9 million households. The program currently
provides subsidies to about 550,000 households
(Millennial Housing Commission 2002).
Section 235 of the Housing Act of 1968 of-
fered a similar subsidy but otherwise operated
differently from the USDA’s Section 502. The
larger component of Section 235 authorized
selected developers to build units and sell them
to eligible families. The smaller Section 235
component provided first-come, first-served
subsidies to low-income buyers of existing
houses. Section 235 was unique among low-
income housing programs in that the major
responsibility for informing the public of its
existence fell upon the real estate industry.
Local Federal Housing Administration (FHA)
insuring offices did not advertise the program
nor did they seek out potential eligible buyers
(U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1971). Unlike
Section 502, this program suffered from scan-
dals and high default rates (Carliner 1998). It
was suspended in 1973, reactivated in 1975,
severely limited geographically in 1983, and
terminated in 1987. Over this period, it pro-
vided subsidies to more 500,000 low-income
households. However, only about 5,000 house-
holds continue to receive subsidies.
The HOME Investment Partnerships Pro-
gram enacted in 1990 is a block grant for hous-
ing assistance. It currently allocates about 
$2 billion a year in federal funds by formula to
state and local governments to spend on vari-
ous types of housing assistance, subject to cer-
tain limits on the incomes of the households
served, the cost to acquire and develop units,
and the rents that may be charged for rental
units. In 2002, state and local governments
devoted about 48 percent of their HOME budg-
ets to homeownership assistance. About 35 per-
cent of homeownership assistance was in grants
and below–market rate loans to low-income
homeowners to rehabilitate their houses (Turn-
ham et al. 2003). The remaining 65 percent was
allocated to homebuyers. Local housing agen-
cies are authorized to provide direct assistance
to homebuyers or to allocate funds to selected
developers who build units and sell them to eli-
gible families. Although data are limited, they
show that 44 percent of homebuyer programs
provide direct assistance to homebuyers who
are free to choose their units, and that 56 per-
cent tie assistance to the purchase of particular
units (Turnham et al. 2003).11 The median per
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unit subsidy under the direct assistance pro-
grams is much smaller than under the unit-
based assistance programs—$8,000 versus 
more than $20,000 (Turnham et al. 2003).
Through 2002, this program subsidized about
270,000 homebuyers and 143,000 existing
homeowners (Turnham et al. 2003).
The Mortgage Revenue Bond Program uses
the tax system to subsidize homeownership.
Since its inception in 1913, the federal income 
tax has excluded the interest on state and local
bonds from taxation. For decades, state and
local housing agencies have issued mortgage
revenue bonds and used the proceeds to pro-
vide below–market rate loans to homebuyers.
The Mortgage Subsidy Bond Tax Act of 1980
and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 limited the
mortgage revenue bonds that each political
jurisdiction could issue, the borrower’s income,
and the house’s purchase price. The Mortgage
Revenue Bond Program currently provides
about 100,000 loans each year at below-market
interest rates to low-income, first-time home-
buyers. Over its history, this program has sub-
sidized about 2.4 million loans. In some cases,
the authority to allocate loans has been given to
selected builders. In others, loans have been
allocated to homebuyers who are free to choose
any unit. The division between these two types
of assistance is not known. However, a 1988 U.S.
General Accounting Office (GAO) report indi-
cates that new housing loans accounted for
about 40 percent of the loans and much of these
funds were set aside for developers (U.S. GAO
1988).
The Community Development Block Grant
Program, enacted in 1974, provides state and
local agencies with block grants for community
development. About a quarter of these grants is
used to provide housing assistance to low- and
moderate-income households. Homeowners
receive about half of this money in grants and
loans at below-market interest rates to reha-
bilitate their homes. In 2004, about 112,000
homeowners received such grants or loans, and
another 14,000 households received other home-
ownership subsidies.12 Subsidizing new con-
struction is severely restricted by statute, and
almost none of the block-grant budget is used
for this purpose.
In summary, all major income-tested home-
ownership programs have provided recipient-
based assistance. In addition, Section 235,
HOME, and the Mortgage Revenue Bond
Program have subsidized selected developers 
to build housing for eligible families. Many pro-
posed programs would allocate their subsidies
to selected developers, for example, the George
W. Bush administration’s proposed Single
Family Affordable Housing Tax Credit and the
Millennial Housing Commission’s similar pro-
posal (2002).
Subsidizing Construction Results in
Excessive Cost for Housing
There are good theoretical reasons for expecting
excessive costs from programs that subsidize
new construction and allocate subsidies to
selected developers. The modest evidence avail-
able on homeownership programs and the more
abundant evidence on rental programs support
these theoretical predictions. The remainder of
this section presents the theoretical arguments
and empirical evidence and explains why subsi-
dized construction is not needed to increase the
supply of adequate housing.
One low-cost way to increase homeown-
ership is to convert existing rental units to
owner-occupied units. Converting some of the 
7 million single-family detached units and
duplexes would add to the supply of homes 
for purchase while making fewer units available
for rent. Indeed, entire townhouse projects and
apartment buildings could be converted to con-
dominiums. Newspaper real estate sections
have recently been filled with stories about such
conversions.13 Although changing ownership of
existing rental units will require some transac-
tion costs, these are miniscule compared with
the cost of building new housing. Moreover, all
units built under a homeownership construc-
tion program incur such transaction costs.
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Subsidizing construction is a costly way to
promote homeownership in any market condi-
tions. It is especially difficult to justify now,
when the vacancy rate is near a historic high.
The national rental vacancy rate varied between 
6.9 and 8.2 percent in the quarters from 1986
through 2000, began rising in 2001, peaked at
10.4 percent in first quarter of 2004, and was still
at 9.6 percent in the fourth quarter of 2005.
Why should we subsidize the construction
of new units when so many rental units are
vacant? One tempting answer is that the
vacancy rate varies enormously across geo-
graphical areas and subsidized construction is
necessary to provide housing for low-income
households in markets with the lowest vacancy
rates. Among the 75 largest metropolitan areas
in 2005, the rental vacancy rate varied from 
3.1 percent in Albany to 18.3 percent in Cleve-
land.14 So if this argument were correct, it would
support, at best, subsidized construction in
some areas during some times.15
Increased construction is unquestionably
desirable when vacancy rates are unusually low.
However, subsidizing construction is not neces-
sary to achieve this outcome. The argument for
subsidized construction fails to recognize the
self-corrective nature of the housing market.
When vacancy rates are unusually low in an
area, housing prices are unusually high relative
to the cost of building housing. The unusually
low vacancy rates and high prices of existing
units induce an increase in unsubsidized con-
struction. This construction is typically in the
mid- and high-priced housing market. How-
ever, the movement of middle-income families
out of existing units and into new ones filters
these existing units into the lower-priced mar-
ket if the vacancy rate is unusually low and
rents are unusually high.
The view that recipient-based housing assis-
tance cannot be used in tight housing markets
and hence new construction must be subsidized
is inconsistent with evidence on the perform-
ance of the rental housing voucher program.
The data on utilization rates in the Section 8
housing voucher program and on rental
vacancy rates in 71 of the 75 largest metropoli-
tan areas indicate that the voucher utilization
rate does not depend on market tightness. The
average voucher utilization rate was 85.8 per-
cent for housing agencies in metropolitan areas
with higher than average vacancy rates and 
87.9 percent for housing agencies in metropol-
itan areas with lower than average vacancy
rates.16 That is, the voucher utilization rate was
actually higher in the tightest housing markets.
One reason housing agencies use nearly all
their vouchers is that they issue more than they
have available, recognizing that some families
offered a voucher will not use it. The agencies
thus achieve high usage rates despite voucher
success rates well below 100 percent.17 The
voucher utilization rate, as opposed to the
voucher success rate, depends primarily on
housing agencies’ aggressiveness in overissuing
vouchers.18 Although some families offered
vouchers do not find housing that suits them
and meets the program’s standards within 
their housing authority’s time limits, other eli-
gible families in the same locality do. This
indicates that the problem is not an absence of
vacant apartments that meet program standards
(or could be repaired inexpensively to meet
these standards) and are affordable to voucher
recipients.
Recipient-based housing assistance is suc-
cessful in the tightest housing markets in part
because many voucher recipients already live in
apartments that meet the program’s minimum
housing standards. Vacant apartments are not
needed for these families. They can participate
without moving. Other families offered vouch-
ers live in housing that does not meet minimum
standards. However, their apartments can be
repaired at low cost to meet the standards.
Similarly, vacant apartments that do not initially
meet the minimum standards can be upgraded.
That is, housing vouchers can increase the
number of units meeting minimum housing
standards even if they have no effect on new
construction.
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Allocating Subsidies to Selected Sellers
Leads to Excessive Cost
Programs that allocate subsidies to selected sell-
ers have consistently led to excessive unit costs,
and they have sometimes led to corruption. The
evidence on rental housing programs is more
abundant, but some evidence exists for home-
ownership programs as well. This section ex-
plains the reason to expect these outcomes and
summarizes the evidence.
Under some past homeownership pro-
grams, selected builders were authorized to
build and sell a specified number of houses to
eligible families. The number of houses author-
ized has always been a small fraction of the
number of eligible families. The subsidy has
usually been in down-payment assistance or
reduced mortgage payments. Due to these sub-
sidies, the number of eligible families that
would want to participate in the program if
builders charged market prices for the houses
has greatly exceeded the number of houses
authorized. As a result, the developers author-
ized to build and sell units under the program
have been able to sell their units even if they
charged above-market prices. Past homeowner-
ship programs tried to prevent excessive prices,
primarily by limiting the sales price. However,
these programs were not able to prevent inferior
materials and workmanship that reduce the
developer’s cost and lower the market value of
the house. The results have been excessive costs
for the housing provided.
Since developers can earn more on their
investment of money and time for subsidized
than for unsubsidized construction, they apply
for many more units than can be funded.19 This
situation gives developers an incentive to pay
bribes or use political influence to get their proj-
ects funded. In programs involving FHA mort-
gage insurance, FHA sent its own appraisers 
to mortgaged houses to protect its interest by
certifying that the houses were not overpriced.
Some of these appraisers were later convicted 
of accepting bribes to provide a false certifica-
tion when the house was greatly overpriced.20
Other appraisers who did the same surely went
undetected.
Direct evidence on the extent of overpricing
of units under past homeownership programs is
meager. Sa-Aadu, Benjamin, and Sirmans (1992)
find that the mean sales price exceeded the
mean market price by about 93 percent of the
subsidy under the Mortgage Revenue Bond
(MRB) Program for houses where sellers con-
trolled the distribution of the MRB subsidy.
However, their data is limited to sales of condo-
miniums in only seven projects located in Baton
Rouge. Twenty-four of the condominiums were
financed with the help of a MRB subsidy and
102 were financed conventionally. Using data
on home purchases financed with conventional
loans and MRB loans that were not allocated to
builders or brokers, McClure (1992) finds no
evidence that sales prices were higher than mar-
ket prices. These results are also based on small
samples—126 sales financed with MRB loans
and 159 financed with conventional loans in
Kansas City and Independence, Missouri.
U.S. HUD (1974) reported no difference
between the sales price and market value of
units built under Section 235. However, the
underlying analysis did not account for differ-
ences between subsidized and unsubsidized
houses in the quality of the materials and work-
manship. Skimping on these aspects of con-
struction is arguably the primary mechanism
through which developers could earn excess
profits under a program that limits the sales
price of a house.
The evidence on rental housing programs
buttresses the evidence on homeownership pro-
grams. It shows that recipient-based housing
assistance provides equivalent housing at much
lower cost than assistance tied to particular hous-
ing projects. Four major studies (Mayo et al. 1980;
Olsen and Barton 1983; Wallace et al. 1981; U.S.
HUD 1974) estimate both the total cost per unit
and the mean market rent of apartments pro-
vided by housing vouchers and the largest older
production programs, namely Public Housing,
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Section 236, and Section 8 New Construction.21
These studies are based on data from a wide
variety of housing markets and for projects built
in many different years. Two were expensive
studies conducted for HUD by a respected re-
search firm during the Nixon, Ford, Carter, and
Reagan administrations. All find housing vouch-
ers cost less than any of the production programs
for the same quality of housing.
The studies with the most detailed infor-
mation about housing characteristics found the
largest excess costs for the production pro-
grams. Mayo and others (1980) estimated the
cost of public housing exceeded the costs of
housing vouchers for equally desirable housing
by 64 percent and 91 percent in the two cities
studied; the cost of Section 236 was 35 percent
and 75 percent higher than vouchers in these
cities. Another study with excellent data on
housing characteristics estimated the excessive
cost of Section 8 new construction compared 
to recipient-based Section 8 certificates to be
between 44 and 78 percent.22
Recent U.S. GAO studies (2001, 2002) pro-
duced similar results for the major active con-
struction programs—LIHTC, HOPE VI, Section
202, Section 515, and Section 811.23 Although the
cost disadvantage relative to vouchers appeared
smaller than for older programs of project-based
assistance, ranging from 12 percent for Section
811 to 27 percent for HOPE VI (U.S. GAO 2001),
these estimates did not take account of signifi-
cant costs of the construction programs, such as
the market value of the land, the cost of prepar-
ing the site for HOPE VI projects, and the costs
to local taxpayers of property tax abatements.
Making HUD’s Housing Voucher
Program Neutral with Respect 
to Homeownership
If promoting homeownership among low-
income families is a national goal, local housing
agencies should be required to offer this option
to all eligible families who reach the top of the
housing voucher waiting list. Furthermore, the
homeownership option should not be limited to
first-time homebuyers. Each year, some low-
income homeowners give up their homes and
move to rental units in response to financial
reversals. Since voucher assistance increases
when income falls, it would cushion such finan-
cial reversals and allow some of these house-
holds to remain in their homes. More broadly, 
it seems inappropriate to deny assistance to
homeowners who are as poor as assisted rent-
ers. Many homeowners have extremely low
incomes even after accounting for the equity in
their homes (table 1).
The homeownership option should include
counseling for low-income first-time homebuy-
ers to help them become homeowners and re-
tain their homes. Stability of homeownership is
important but often overlooked.24 The cost of
counseling for first-time homebuyers would 
be a small part of the budget of the revised
voucher program. For existing homeowners, the
only additional administrative burden would
involve determining the equity in their houses
and adding a return on this equity to their in-
comes to determine subsidy payments. 
The operators of the Housing Assistance
Supply Experiment (HASE) developed simple
procedures for counting a return to home equity
and reported no problems (Lowry 1980). Re-
cipient homeowners had to document the
assessed value of their houses and the outstand-
ing balance on each mortgage. Program staff
adjusted assessed values for the average differ-
ence between assessed and market value in each
site and applied a uniform rate of return to the
estimated equity on each house (Katagiri and
Kingsley 1980; Rizor 1982).
How many additional families would be
induced to buy homes if the voucher program
were made tenure neutral? The HASE suggests
that while many homeowners would take up
the vouchers, few additional households would
become homeowners. In the HASE, the over-
whelming majority of participating home-
owners were homeowners prior to receipt of
housing assistance (Lowry 1983).25
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Still, the reform would make the homeown-
ership option more attractive by allowing
households to use their housing subsidy to buy
instead of rent. Many households would find
homeownership feasible at existing subsidy lev-
els. Between April 2004 and April 2005, the
average subsidy for a two-bedroom unit was
about $750 per month for the poorest families
eligible and about $450 per month for a family
with an adjusted income of $1,000 a month. The
$450 subsidy is sufficient to finance the full
monthly payment for a $75,000 mortgage repaid
over 30 years at 6 percent interest. As noted
above, homes valued at $80,000 or less made up
21 percent of all owner-occupied dwellings in
2005 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2006).
A common objection to assisting homeown-
ers under the voucher program is the likelihood
that assistance to eligible families with relatively
higher incomes will come at the expense of
poorer households. Because eligible homeowners
have higher average incomes than eligible rent-
ers, a tenure-neutral program that selected re-
cipients at random from all eligible households
would serve higher-income households than a
program restricted to renters would. But, recipi-
ents need not be selected at random. Indeed, the
current voucher program has federal income-
targeting rules that require at least 75 percent of
new vouchers go to extremely low income house-
holds.26 As a result, current rules restrict the bulk
of voucher assistance to the poorest households.
For a tenure-neutral program, modifying the
income limits and targeting rules can counteract
the distributional effects of the proposed reform
and maintain the focus on the poorest house-
holds. Better yet, the housing voucher program
could be converted into an entitlement by pro-
viding smaller subsidies to new recipients and
serving more families with the current budget.
Encouraging Homeownership in the
Housing Voucher Program
The Section 8 voucher program could further
encourage homeownership among low-income
households by providing an upfront subsidy to
voucher recipients who want to become first-
time homebuyers. There are different ways of
financing this type of subsidy without adding to
the program’s cost. Recipients of upfront subsi-
dies, for instance, could exchange that benefit
for lower subsidies later. Another way is to dif-
ferently allocate the money made available when
voucher recipients leave the program. These
resources could be used to provide slightly less
generous monthly subsidies to all new recipi-
ents and downpayment subsidies to those who
want to become first-time homebuyers.
Administering a homeownership option
within the voucher program need not be com-
plicated. The proposed downpayment subsidy
could be some multiple of the monthly subsidy
for which the recipient is initially eligible. Pub-
lic housing agencies need not involve them-
selves in negotiations with mortgage lenders 
or real estate brokers beyond certifying the
amounts of assistance that would be provided
to recipients, that is, a payment of X toward
closing costs and the downpayment and Y per
month for the first year. The certification would
also state how the monthly payment from the
government in each later year would vary with
the household’s income. From the lenders’
viewpoint, the increase in subsidy when the
recipient’s income falls reduces the risk associ-
ated with the loan.
Although alternative types of financing
were discussed above, some will object to the
particular approach that involves lower subsi-
dies for recipients in general (versus lower sub-
sidies later for those choosing the option of
upfront subsidies to help with downpayments),
thinking that recipients who rent will be unable
to find housing meeting the program’s mini-
mum housing standards. However, research has
shown that the voucher program provides sub-
sidies that are much larger than necessary to
occupy units meeting the program’s housing
standards (Cutts and Olsen 2002; Olsen and
Reeder 1983). In addition, the long waiting lists
for vouchers guarantee that housing authorities
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will have no difficulty using their vouchers
despite a modest reduction in subsidy.27 Since
about 12 percent of recipients leave the program
every year, this reform would ease the transition
to a program that would better achieve the
goals of low-income housing policy.
Expanding the Reformed 
Housing Voucher Program
The voucher program currently accounts for
less than 25 percent of all households that
receive low-income housing assistance. This
limits the impact the proposed modifications of
its structure could have on low-income home-
ownership. A few simple changes in other low-
income housing programs can overcome this
limitation.
Most low-income housing assistance con-
sists of rental assistance in designated public
and private subsidized projects. Unfortunately,
project-based assistance is an excessively costly
way to provide housing compared with recipi-
ent-based vouchers.28 Project-based assistance
also needlessly restricts recipient choice. Re-
cipient-based assistance allows a family to use
its subsidy to rent (or in some cases buy) from
any supplier who provides housing meeting the
program’s standards. If the subsidy is attached
to a housing project, the family must accept the
particular unit offered in order to receive assis-
tance and loses the subsidy when it moves.
These restrictions concentrate recipients of proj-
ect-based subsidies—public housing projects 
are found in only 8 percent of census tracts in
the 50 largest metropolitan areas, and privately
owned HUD-subsidized projects are in only 
17 percent (Devine et al. 2003). In contrast, the
choices afforded by the voucher program have
dispersed the recipient population; voucher
recipients living in the 50 largest metropolitan
areas are in units in more than 80 percent of cen-
sus tracts. Choice enables voucher recipients to
live in better neighborhoods than public and
private subsidized projects. Only 5 percent of
voucher recipients live in census tracts with a
poverty rate exceeding 40 percent, compared to
10 percent of the occupants of private subsi-
dized projects and 36 percent of public housing
tenants (Newman and Schnare 1997).
Given the higher cost-effectiveness of
vouchers and the virtues of choice, the case is
strong for shifting low-income housing assis-
tance from project based to recipient based as
soon as current contractual commitments per-
mit. One approach would be to offer all public
housing tenants housing vouchers using the
money currently provided to housing authori-
ties as operating and modernization subsidies
for their projects. Occupants of private subsi-
dized projects would receive portable vouchers
at the end of the project’s use agreement.
Phasing out subsidized private projects
would not require new administrative proce-
dures. Currently, each year, some of these
projects’ owners remove their units from the
subsidy programs at the end of their use agree-
ments. Under existing procedures, the programs
continue to subsidize the households that have
been living in these projects by providing
portable housing vouchers. This proposal sim-
plifies this process because housing authorities
would not have to use administrative resources
to determine what new incentives to offer own-
ers to remain in the program or to negotiate a
new use agreement. 
The public housing reform requires elab-
oration. The proposal is that Congress should
require every local public housing agency to
offer each current public housing family the
option of either taking a portable housing
voucher or remaining in its current unit on the
previous terms. The latter option insures that no
public housing tenant is harmed by the legisla-
tion. Families that accept a voucher would ben-
efit by moving to housing, neighborhoods, or
locations that they prefer to their public housing
units. Some might buy a house under the re-
formed voucher program. Each housing agency
would receive the same total federal funding
but would have to devote some of its budget to
the voucher program. Housing agencies could
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sell their projects but would not have to do so.
The sales would yield money to operate, main-
tain, and modernize the housing agency’s
remaining projects. Many housing agencies
would surely sell their worst projects. These are
the most expensive projects to renovate and the
projects that the public housing families offered
vouchers are most likely to abandon. When a
project is sold, its remaining tenants would be
offered the choice between vacant units in other
public housing projects or a housing voucher.29
When public housing units are vacated for
whatever reason, the housing agency would be
required to offer a housing voucher to a family
from its public housing waiting list using its
existing preference system. This policy insures
that the housing agency will continue to pro-
vide housing assistance to the same number
and type of families. However, agencies would
be allowed the freedom to charge market rents
for vacated units. These higher rents will pro-
vide agencies with additional revenue. More
importantly, the new policy would make agency
revenues depend partly on the desirability of
their housing. The current disconnect between
revenue and quality is a primary cause of public
housing’s excessive cost.
To insure that the housing authority could
provide vouchers to all public housing tenants
who want them, using a different subsidy for-
mula than the regular Section 8 voucher pro-
gram may be necessary. The standard formula
for the voucher subsidy begins with a payment
standard, or the subsidy level to a household
with no income. The actual subsidy is the stan-
dard less a tenant payment of 30 percent of the
tenant’s adjusted income. Housing agencies
might maintain the percentage difference in the
payment standard between families of different
sizes and compositions as in the regular Section
8 voucher program, but the payment standards
would be different. The payment standards
would have to yield subsidies that satisfy the
budget constraint. These payment standards
could be easily calculated from the housing
authority’s administrative records. Indeed,
HUD’s Office of Policy Development and Re-
search could make these calculations for all
housing authorities.
Administering voucher programs with dif-
ferent payment standards might seem awk-
ward, but local public housing authorities
already maintain separate waiting lists for pub-
lic housing and housing vouchers, and these
programs provide different subsidies to iden-
tical households. Furthermore, the Section 8
voucher program has long applied different
payment standards to subsets of its participants;
for example, a certain fraction of families has
been given higher than average subsidies to live
in more expensive neighborhoods. Except for
payment standards, the voucher program for
public housing tenants would be administered
exactly like the regular voucher program.
Under the proposal, public housing authori-
ties would charge market rents for their vacated
public housing units. Estimating these market
rents is not a new activity for housing authori-
ties. Since the 1998 Housing Act was imple-
mented, housing authorities have been required
to estimate their units’ market rents.30 Now,
each public housing tenant is offered the option
of either paying a rent determined by the tradi-
tional formula or paying the market rent.
To promote economic integration in public
housing projects, Congress could eliminate the
income limits on families that move into vacated
public housing units. Since the new occupants
would receive little or no public subsidy, income
targeting would serve little or no public purpose.
This change would also reduce the public hous-
ing authorities’ administrative workload.
Creating a Refundable Tax Credit to
Promote Homeownership
Modifying the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
(LIHTC) provides another excellent opportunity
to promote homeownership among low-income
households. The LIHTC subsidizes the construc-
tion and substantial rehabilitation of rental hous-
ing for low-income households. It has accounted
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for about half of additional households subsi-
dized under all low-income rental housing pro-
grams over the past decade. In 2000, Congress
increased new commitments of these tax credits
by 40 percent and tied future tax expenditures to
the consumer price index. Shortly thereafter, the
GAO completed the first independent analysis of
the LIHTC’s cost-effectiveness (U.S. GAO 2001,
2002).31 According to the GAO study, the tax
credit program is an excessively costly way 
to provide housing compared with housing
vouchers. These findings suggest that the cur-
rent program should be replaced with a more
cost-effective approach to delivering housing
assistance.
A minimal response to the GAO study
would be to freeze the credits allocated to state
agencies under the current program while under-
taking a new independent cost-effectiveness
analysis. In the meantime, the reduced tax expen-
ditures on the rental tax credits could be diverted
to a refundable tax credit for low-income first-
time homebuyers. Like the earned income tax
credit, this tax credit for homeownership would
be available to all low-income households. It
would not be funneled through builders. It
would be largest for the poorest households and
decline to zero for households at some income
level below the median.
In its first year, only modest tax credits
would be available. However, additional money
would be available each year in real terms,
allowing the homeownership tax credit to
become more generous and serve more house-
holds. When sufficient money becomes available,
the tax credit might be offered to all low-income
homeowners. These tax credits would enable
some low-income homeowners to keep their
homes—homes they would otherwise lose
because of a decline in income and an inability to
make mortgage and property tax payments.
Conclusions
Helping low-income families obtain decent
housing is a major public policy priority. The
federal government devotes over $40 billion to
the effort, mainly to subsidize rental housing.
But, while housing policies for middle- and
upper-income groups encourage homeowner-
ship, programs for low-income families include
a strong anti-homeownership bias. Why should
the government favor ownership for one group
and discourage ownership for another?
Recognizing this bias is the first step toward
reform. The next step is to understand why
existing rental and homeownership programs
are beset by other structural problems. A central
problem is that channeling subsidies through
construction-related programs, where subsidies
are allocated to selected sellers, is an excessively
costly way to help low-income families obtain
housing. Programs adopting this approach also
increase the concentration of the poor and
minority families.
This paper presents several cost-neutral
approaches for reducing the anti-homeowner-
ship bias, along with related suggestions for im-
proving outcomes in the main rental-subsidy
programs. The goals are not only to encourage
families to select the best housing option avail-
able, whether rental or owner occupied, but to
increase the system’s cost-effectiveness as a
whole.
The primary proposal presented here is to
require local public housing authorities to 
offer the homeownership option to families 
that reach the top of its voucher waiting list.
Methods were discussed on how to ensure that
the benefits were distributed as progressively as
under current law. Two possible extensions of
that approach are also presented: to provide a
down-payment subsidy for first-time homebuy-
ers within the voucher program and to expand
the reformed voucher program by offering
portable vouchers to all families living in public
housing projects (financed by existing operating
and modernization subsidies for public housing
projects) and to all families living in private
subsidized projects (at the end of their use
agreements). A second proposal is to gradually
convert the LIHTC for rental housing develop-
P R O M OT I N G  H O M E O W N E R S H I P
13
ers into one that can also be used for homeown-
ership, for example, by converting the existing
credit into a refundable homeownership tax
credit for low-income families. Of course, there
are alternative ways of removing the bias of this
credit against homeownership.
These proposals avoid the two biggest
mistakes in past attempts to subsidize
homeownership—subsidizing the construction
of new units and requiring intended beneficiar-
ies to buy from selected sellers. If implemented,
the reforms could improve housing outcomes at
no new cost by providing low-income families
with new choices for meeting their housing
needs.
Notes
1. This result is based on outlays for the U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development’s tenant-based
voucher program, public housing program, and pro-
grams of private subsidized projects, and for its major
block grants that provide housing assistance (HOME,
CDBG, and Native American); the U.S. Department of
Agriculture’s programs that subsidize privately owned
rental projects and its single family direct loan program
for homeowners; and the tax expenditures under the
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, mortgage revenue
bonds, and multifamily housing bonds.
2. Rates of return on home equity are not routinely re-
ported. However, they surely vary greatly from time 
to time and from place to place. Since the return on
home equity is untaxed, the relevant rate of return is the
after-tax return on a taxed investment of the same risk.
Capital will flow between home equity and the taxed
investment until the untaxed rate of return on home
equity is equal to the after-tax rate of return on a taxed
investment of the same risk. Index funds based on the
S&P 500 and the Wilshire 4500 are plausible candidates
for taxed investments with the same risk as home equity.
The returns on both indices vary greatly from year to
year. Between 1996 and 2005, the return on the S&P
index fund varied from a high of 33.17 percent in 1997 to
a low of -22.05 percent in 2002. The before-tax rate of
return on the stocks in the S&P 500 averaged about 
9.01 percent over this period and the rate of return on
the stocks in the Wilshire 4500 averaged about 9.75 per-
cent. Because the marginal tax rate is zero for the poorest
households, 10 percent is arguably a reasonable estimate
of their return for home equity. For richer households, it
is perhaps too high.
3. A similar pattern emerges when income is not adjusted
for home equity or geographical price differences, but the
homeownership rates in the first two deciles are higher.
For example, without the adjustments, 52.5, rather than
24.7, percent of unsubsidized households in the lowest
income decile are homeowners and 6.5, rather than 
4.6, percent of subsidized households are homeowners.
4. The decisions of state and local governmental bodies
play a small role in this outcome. Under the HOME,
CDBG, and Native American block-grant programs,
recipient governments choose how much of the federal
grant to allocate to subsidizing renters and homeowners
in various income categories. However, these block
grants account for only 8 percent of the budget for low-
income housing assistance.
5. This would be the average subsidy if each housing
authority set its payment standards equal to the so-
called fair market rents for households of each size.
Housing authorities are allowed to deviate from these
amounts by up to 10 percent in either direction without
HUD approval, and some deviate in each direction.
6. The two sites were Brown County, Wisconsin (contain-
ing Green Bay), and St. Joseph County, Indiana (contain-
ing South Bend). To say that a housing program is
tenure neutral is to say that a recipient is offered the
same subsidy on the same terms whether he owns or
rents his dwelling unit. Olsen (2003) provides an
overview of the Housing Assistance Supply Experiment
(HASE) and the other components of EHAP. Lowry
(1983) gives a more detailed account of the HASE
results.
7. Beyond the administrative resources needed to establish
the procedures for the new program, the major adminis-
trative burden of the voucher option is to provide home-
ownership counseling to prospective homeowners.
HUD regulations give local housing authorities consid-
erable discretion concerning the details of the counsel-
ing. To date, much of this counseling has been done by
agencies that receive their funding from other govern-
ment programs. However, 15 percent of local public
housing agencies use their own staff to provide all of the
counseling and 34 percent use their staff to provide
some of it. About 53 percent of these agencies use their
general voucher administrative fees to fund these activ-
ities (Locke et al. 2006). 
8. Notice PIH 2005-14 (HA).
9. Notice PIH 2006-5 (HA).
10. See Carliner (1998) for a brief history of the development
of the program and Mikesell and others (1999) for both
descriptive statistics and the first analysis of this pro-
gram based on a nationally representative survey.
11. Individual participating jurisdictions often have more
than one homebuyer program (Turnham et al. 2003). 
The result in the text is based on these individual pro-
grams. Each individual program is in only one of the
two categories.
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12. For data on this program, see http://www.hud.gov/
offices/cpd/communitydevelopment/library/
accomplishments/CDBGAccomplishmentsl_National.
xls and http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/community
development/budget/disbursementreports/
disbursements_all.xls (accessed July 9, 2007).
13. See, for example, David Cho, “Putting Renters on the
Spot: Condominium Conversions Force Residents to Find
New Housing,” Washington Post, June 7, 2005, p. B01.
14. See http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs
annual06/ann06t5.html (accessed July 13, 2007).
15. The argument that subsidized construction is necessary
to provide rental or ownership assistance to low-income
households in markets with the lowest vacancy rates has
been influential in debates on the creation and funding
of housing programs. Yet, it has had no effect on policy
design. No subsidized construction program has ever
been limited to tight housing markets, and funding for
these programs has never been routinely reduced in
response to rising vacancy rates. The Low-Income
Housing Tax Credit has subsidized an increasing num-
ber of units since 2000 despite the soaring rental vacancy
rate.
16. HUD’s Office of Policy Development and Research col-
lected voucher utilization information in 2002; vacancy
rates come from the U.S. Bureau of the Census.
17. The voucher utilization rate is the fraction of all vouch-
ers in use during a period of time. The success rate is the
fraction of families offered vouchers that find a unit
meeting the program’s housing standards within the
time allowed.
18. Current regulations call for penalties on agencies with
usage rates below 97 percent. Recently, Congress re-
stricted housing authorities’ ability to overissue vouch-
ers. Modifications of the program’s rules that will
achieve the purposes of these restrictions but make it
easier for housing authorities to use their entire voucher
budgets may be desirable. To help housing authorities
adjust their issuance of vouchers to exhaust their yearly
voucher budgets, HUD’s Office of Policy Development
and Research has developed a user-friendly, web-based
computer program. See http://www.huduser.org/vip/
index. cfm (accessed July 16, 2007).
19. For the excess developer demand for low-income hous-
ing tax credits, see National Council of State Housing
Agencies (2005).
20. See, for example, Edith Evans Asbury, “F.H.A. Aide
Pleads Guilty to Fraud,” New York Times, September 13,
1972, p. 17; Edith Evans Asbury, “F.H.A. Will Close
Hempstead Unit,” New York Times, January 21, 1973, 
p. 37; and Morris Kaplan, “6 Named in Indictment on
Mortgage-Fraud Plot,” New York Times, August 17, 1973,
p. 64.
21. Olsen (2000) provides a description and critical ap-
praisal of the data and methods used in these studies 
as well as a summary of their results.
22. Wallace and others (1981) make predictions of the mar-
ket rents of subsidized units based on two data sets on
the rent and characteristics of unsubsidized units. The
study did not collect information on the indirect costs of
the Section 8 New Construction program. These indirect
subsidies include the Government National Mortgage
Association’s Tandem Plan interest subsidies for FHA-
insured projects and the tax revenue forgone due to the
tax-exempt status of interest on the bonds that fund 
state housing-finance agency projects. Based on previous
studies, the authors argue that these indirect costs
would add 20 to 30 percent to the total cost of the
Section 8 New Construction program. The range of esti-
mates reported in the text is based on the four combina-
tions of the two predictions of market rent and the lower
and upper limits on the indirect costs.
23. Active construction programs are programs that con-
tinue to produce additional units. HOPE VI is an initia-
tive within the public housing program to demolish its
worst units and rebuild at lower densities.
24. Haurin and Rosenthal (2004) show that the differences
between the homeownership rates of whites, blacks, and
Hispanics at a point in time are much greater than the
differences in the percentage of the members of these
groups who are homeowners sometime during their
lives. This is not simply due to delayed onset of home-
ownership. “Once a homeowner, always a homeowner”
is far from true. Minorities have shorter homeownership
spells followed by longer rental spells.
25. Evidence from the Supply Experiment is not a perfect
guide to the outcome of the proposed reform of the
Section 8 voucher program, because the programs differ
in important respects. The voucher program has higher
real income limits, and it is not an entitlement housing
assistance program. The families offered assistance
under the voucher program are determined by federal
income-targeting rules and local preference systems. 
The income targeting rules require local public housing
authorities to offer at least 75 percent of new vouchers to
recipients with incomes below limits based on 30 per-
cent of the local median. Within this constraint, the pref-
erence systems of local public housing authorities
determine which families participate in the Section 8
voucher program. Furthermore, HASE provided little
homeownership counseling to potential recipients. Only
a part of one voluntary counseling session dealt with
homeownership (Rand 1978).
26. For four-person households, these are households with
incomes less than 30 percent of the local median. The
income limits are lower for smaller families and higher
for larger families.
27. Olsen, Davis, and Carrillo (2005) have estimated that a
$100 decrease in the monthly subsidy at each income
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level due a reduction in the program’s payment stan-
dard would increase attrition in the voucher program by
only 3 percent. Replacing these households with the
poorest households on the waiting lists would be no
problem.
28. Olsen (2004) summarizes this evidence. Olsen (2000)
provides more details.
29. This is a possible exception to the assertion that no ten-
ants would be hurt by the proposal. Some tenants might
want to remain in the projects that the housing authority
decides to sell, even if the housing authority sells its
worst projects. In practice, designing reforms that hurt
no one is impossible. The losses to these tenants must be
weighed against the gains to other tenants. It is difficult
to justify renovating structures that reach a certain level
of obsolescence and dilapidation, and Congress has
made a policy decision to tear down the worst public
housing projects even if some tenants would like to
remain in them. About 80,000 distressed public housing
units have been torn down under the HOPE VI pro-
gram, and others were torn down earlier.
30. 65FR16692.
31. Olsen (2004) summarizes this evidence.
About the Author
Edgar O. Olsen is a professor of
economics at the University of
Virginia. His research on low-
income housing policy has been
published in leading professional
journals and edited volumes, he
has served as a consultant on housing policy
issues to federal and state agencies, and he has
testified on these matters before congressional
committees.
References
Carasso, Adam, Elizabeth Bell, Edgar O. Olsen, and C.
Eugene Steuerle. 2005. “Improving Homeownership
among Poor and Moderate-Income Households.”
Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. Opportunity and
Ownership Project Brief 2. http://www.urban.org/url.
cfm?ID=311184. (Accessed July 9, 2007.)
Carliner, Michael S. 1998. “Development of Federal Home-
ownership ‘Policy’.” Housing Policy Debate 9(2): 299–321.
Cutts, Amy Crews, and Edgar O. Olsen. 2002. “Are Section 8
Housing Subsidies Too High?” Journal of Housing Eco-
nomics 11(3): 214–43.
Devine, Deborah J., Robert W. Gray, Lester Rubin, and Lydia
B. Taghavi. 2003. Housing Choice Voucher Location Pat-
terns. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development.
Haurin, Donald R., and Stuart S. Rosenthal. 2004. The
Sustainability of Homeownership: Factors Affecting the
Duration of Homeownership and Rental Spells. Report pre-
pared for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development. Bethesda, MD: Abt Associates.
Katagiri, Iao, and G. Thomas Kingsley, eds. 1980. The
Housing Allowance Office Handbook. N-1491-HUD. Santa
Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
Ling, David C., and Gary A. McGill. 1992. “Measuring the
Size and Distributional Effects of Homeowner Tax
Preferences.” Journal of Housing Research 3(2): 273–303.
Locke, Gretchen, Michelle Abbenante, Hong Ly, Naomi
Michlin, Winnie Tsen, and Jennifer Turnham. 2006.
Voucher Homeownership Study: Volume 1–Cross-Site
Analysis. Report prepared for the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development. Bethesda, MD: Abt
Associates.
Lowry, Ira S., ed. 1980. The Design of the Housing Assistance
Supply Experiment. R-2630-HUD. Santa Monica, CA:
Rand Corporation.
———., ed. 1983. Experimenting with Housing Allowances: The
Final Report of the Housing Assistance Supply Experiment.
Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain.
Mayo, Stephen K., Shirley Mansfield, David Warner, and
Richard Zwetchkenbaum. 1980. Housing Allowances and
Other Rental Assistance Programs: A Comparison Based on
the Housing Allowance Demand Experiment, Part 2—Costs
and Efficiency. Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates.
McClure, Kirk. 1992. “Capitalization of the Benefits of Mort-
gage Revenue Bond Financing: Lessons from Empirical
Research.” In Mortgage Revenue Bonds: Housing Markets,
Home Buyers and Public Policy, edited by Danny W.
Durning (chapter 10). Boston: Kluwer Academic
Publishers.
Mikesell, James J., Linda M. Ghelfi, Priscilla Salant, George
Wallace, and Leslie A. Whitener. 1999. Meeting the
Housing Needs of Rural Residents: Results of the 1998 Survey
of USDA’s Single Family Direct Loan Program. Research
Report 91. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Agri-
culture, Economic Research Service, Rural Development.
Millennial Housing Commission. 2002. Meeting Our Nation’s
Housing Challenges. Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office.
National Council of State Housing Agencies. 2005. State
FHA Factbook: 2004 NCSHA Annual Survey Results.
Washington, DC: National Council of State Housing
Agencies.
Newman, Sandra J., and Ann B. Schnare. 1997. “ ‘. . . And a
Suitable Living Environment’: The Failure of Housing
O P P O R T U N I T Y  A N D  O W N E R S H I P  P R O J E C T
16
Programs to Deliver on Neighborhood Quality.” Housing
Policy Debate 8(4): 703–41.
Olsen, Edgar O. 2000. “The Cost-Effectiveness of Alternative
Methods of Delivering Housing Subsidies.” Working
Paper 351. Charlottesville: Thomas Jefferson Center for
Political Economy, University of Virginia. http://www.
virginia.edu/economics/downablepapers.htm#olsen.
(Accessed July 9, 2007.)
———. 2003. “Housing Programs for Low-Income
Households.” In Means-Tested Transfer Programs in the
United States, edited by Robert Moffitt (365–442).
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 2004. “Fundamental Housing Policy Reform.”
Unpublished manuscript, March. http://www.virginia.
edu/economics/downablepapers.htm#olsen. (Accessed
July 9, 2007.)
Olsen, Edgar O., and David M. Barton. 1983. “The Benefits
and Costs of Public Housing in New York City.” Journal
of Public Economics 20(3): 299–332.
Olsen, Edgar O., and William J. Reeder. 1983. “Misdirected
Rental Subsidies.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Manage-
ment 2(4): 614–20.
Olsen, Edgar O., Scott E. Davis, and Paul E. Carrillo. 2005.
“Explaining Attrition in the Housing Voucher Program.”
Cityscape 8(2): 95–113.
Rand Corporation. 1978. Fourth Annual Report of the Housing
Assistance Supply Experiment. R-2302-HUD. Santa
Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
Rizor, W. Eugene. 1982. Eligibility Certification in a Housing
Allowance Program. R-1740-HUD. Santa Monica, CA:
Rand Corporation.
Rosen, Harvey S. 1979. “Housing Decisions and the U.S.
Income Tax: An Econometric Analysis.” Journal of Public
Economics 11(1): 1–23.
Sa-Aadu, J., John D. Benjamin, and C. F. Sirmans. 1992.
“Capitalization and Mortgage Revenue Bonds: Method-
ology, Empirical Evidence, and Policy Implications.” In
Mortgage Revenue Bonds: Housing Markets, Home Buyers
and Public Policy, edited by Danny W. Durning (chapter
8). Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Turnham, Jennifer, Christopher Herbert, Sandra Nolden,
Judith Feins, and Jessica Bonjorni. 2003. Study of Home-
buyer Activity through the HOME Investment Partnership
Program. Abt Associates Report. Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office
of Policy Development and Research.
U.S. Bureau of the Census. 2006. American Housing Survey of
the United States. Current Housing Reports Series H150-
05. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. 1971. Homeownership for
Lower Income Families: A Report on the Racial and Ethnic
Impact of the Section 235 Program. Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office.
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 1974.
Housing in the Seventies. Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office.
U.S. General Accounting Office. 1988. Homeownership: Mort-
gage Bonds Are Costly and Provide Little Assistance to Those
in Need. GAO/RCED-88-111. Washington, DC: U.S. Gen-
eral Accounting Office.
———. 2001. Federal Housing Programs: What They Cost and
What They Provide. GAO-01-901R. Washington, DC: U.S.
General Accounting Office.
———. 2002. Federal Housing Assistance: Comparing the Char-
acteristics and Costs of Housing Programs. GAO-02-76.
Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office.
Wallace, James E., Susan Philipson, William L. Holshouser,
Shirley Mansfield, and Daniel H. Weinberg. 1981. Par-
ticipation and Benefits in the Urban Section 8 Program: New
Construction and Existing Housing, vols. 1 and 2. Cam-
bridge, MA: Abt Associates.

THE URBAN INSTITUTE
2100 M Street N.W.  Washington, D.C. 20037
Tel: (202) 261-5687 • Fax: (202) 467-5775 • www.urban.org
